Build Back Better or MAGA 2.0? The Biden Administration’s Trade Policy
Throughout his campaign for the presidency, Joe Biden portrayed himself as the antithesis to the incumbent president, Donald Trump. On matters ranging from foreign affairs to defense policy, the former Vice President pledged to counter Trump’s “America First” approach, and to return the United States to its role as a major player on the world stage. Though many suspected that this approach would include rolling back the Trump administration’s protectionist trade policies in favor of an open policy towards free trade, Biden has instead largely sustained many of Trump’s measures. These include tariffs on Chinese imports and the crippling of the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) dispute resolution body. He has further adopted a lukewarm stance on entering new trade agreements, while remaining silent on whether he plans to return to deals that the Trump administration backed out of, like the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). While President Biden’s position on trade with non-China partners, and particularly the European Union, has diverged somewhat from that of his predecessor, his broader approach to trade seems to heavily mirror that of the Trump administration. Indeed, one year into the Biden administration’s tenure, realigning America’s trade policy appears to be far from a top priority.
Since taking office, the Biden administration has not been particularly aggressive in pursuing new trade deals. For example, the United States previously traded with the United Kingdom under a trade agreement with the European Union (EU), which the UK was a member of until January 2020. Upon the UK’s withdrawal from that alliance, it had to negotiate new free trade agreements with the rest of the world, including the United States. However, as Megan Boyanton (2021) writes for Bloomberg, “Biden hasn’t made trade with the U.K. an immediate priority for his administration…” and “The pace of progress [of negotiations] has slowed…” The stalled progress on negotiations for a trade deal with a major ally is indicative of Biden’s broader ambivalence towards forging new agreements. Furthermore, Biden’s representatives remain silent on joining the CPTPP, the successor deal to the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which Trump removed the US from in the early days of his presidency. Per Edward Alden (2021) of ForeignPolicy.com, US Trade Representative Katherine Tai “has so far deflected questions about joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP)...” Therefore, the administration’s policy doesn’t seem to have evolved from its predecessor’s when it comes to joining existing Asian trade deals. Lastly, the administration has put forward a proposal for a new Asian trade framework called the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, though according to Marc Busch (2021), the proposal lacks much clarity, with one report he references calling it “undefined.” Thus, it’s clear that for the Biden administration, entering new trade pacts and rejoining old ones doesn’t appear to be much of a priority.
Another key Trump-era policy left in place by the Biden administration is the decision to block the appointment of judges to the WTO’s Appellate Body, which helps resolve international trade disputes. According to Sarah Anne Aarup (2021) of Politico, the Trump administration halted appointments to the panel, and the Biden administration remains equally focused on sustaining this veto, rendering the panel impotent. Rather than any concrete change, Aarup says the major distinction between the Trump and Biden WTO policies is simply that Biden has taken a more diplomatic approach in terms of rhetoric towards the organization, whereas Trump threatened to withdraw the US from it altogether. Thus, as Aarup puts it, when it comes to the WTO, “Biden is bringing changes of style rather than substance.” He has otherwise retained the Trump administration’s hostility toward certain organs of the WTO.
Trade policy toward China is yet another area in which the Biden administration’s approach has been quite similar to that of its predecessor. Trump’s tenure was marked by the imposition of hundreds of billions of dollars in tariffs on Chinese imports. According to Alden (2021) of ForeignPolicy.com, the Biden administration has made it clear that those tariffs will stay in place. Furthermore, per Alan Beattie (2022) of the Financial Times, the Biden administration is continuing with another widely maligned piece of Trump China policy: the Phase I trade deal signed in January 2020 which would require China to expand its purchases of US exports. Describing the deal as “wrong-headed,” Beattie says that Biden is keeping it in place, along with Trump’s tariffs, because he feels it is politically expedient to do so. Therefore, the centerpiece of Biden’s trade stance towards China seems to be the preservation of Donald Trump’s highly interventionist policies. Alden (2021) does allow that Biden’s policy has diverged slightly from Trump’s, with the administration promising to “restart an “exclusion” process that should give relief to some U.S. companies harmed by the tariffs.” Despite this relatively minor accommodation, however, Biden’s China trade policy remains almost a mirror image of Donald Trump’s, with tariffs and the Phase I deal leading the way.
By contrast, one area in which Biden has forged his own path is in resolving trade disputes with non-China countries. In 2021, Biden and the executive commission of the European Union announced an end to the seventeen year long trade dispute between the US and the EU over aircraft manufacturers Boeing and Airbus. Per the BBC (2021), the dispute began when the US and Europe accused each other of providing inappropriate assistance to their domestic aircraft manufacturers. The conflict escalated, with each side penalizing the other with billions of dollars worth of import tariffs. In 2021, however, the two sides agreed to suspend the tariffs for five years, indicative of Biden’s more conciliatory policy towards trade with the EU. Additionally, Biden continued his more open approach to European trade with another deal, announced in October 2021, to roll back the metal tariffs imposed by Trump. According to CNBC’s Silvia Amaro (2021), the Trump tariffs on European steel and aluminum were imposed on national security grounds, and the Biden agreement will suspend the measures, with corresponding suspensions by the EU of its retaliatory tariffs on US peanut butter, bourbon, and other goods. Thus, President Biden’s stance toward trade with non-China countries, and in particular the European Union, represents a far more conciliatory approach than Donald Trump’s, and aims to ease trade restrictions on close US allies.
In the first year of Joe Biden’s presidency, it has become clear that the stark contrasts between his policies and Donald Trump’s mostly do not extend to those concerning international trade. Rather, Biden has continued many of Trump’s policies, though at times with a lighter touch. With an ambivalent attitude towards new trade deals, a continuation of Trump’s hostile actions at the WTO, and the maintenance of tariffs and the Phase I trade deal, Biden’s policy doesn’t appear highly distinct from that of his predecessor. In his relations with non-China countries, Biden has clearly sought to ease trade tensions and roll back tariffs, but overall, his trade policies are mostly a continuation of Donald Trump’s. Though it has been active on many political issues, trade policy appears to be one that the Biden administration intends to keep on the back burner.
Works Cited
Aarup, Sarah Anne. “‘All Talk and No Walk’: America Ain’t Back at the WTO.” POLITICO, 23 Nov. 2021, www.politico.eu/article/united-states-world-trade-organization-joe-biden/. Accessed 6 Feb. 2022.
Alden, Edward. “Biden’s Vague Muddle of a Trade Policy for China.” Foreign Policy, 7 Oct. 2021, foreignpolicy.com/2021/10/07/biden-trade-china-asia-indo-pacific-policy/.
Allott, Daniel. “Biden’s Muddled Trade Policy.” TheHill, 24 Dec. 2021, thehill.com/opinion/international/587213-bidens-muddled-trade-policy?rl=1. Accessed 6 Feb. 2022.
Amaro, Silvia. “U.S. And EU Agree to Ease Metal Tariffs Imposed by Trump Administration.” CNBC, 30 Oct. 2021, www.cnbc.com/2021/10/30/us-eu-agree-to-end-trump-era-dispute.html.
Beattie, Alan. “China Trade Surplus That Can’t Be Fixed from Outside.” Financial Times, 24 Jan. 2022, www.ft.com/content/54334d94-de69-4254-9f74-e56f62b33f6c. Accessed 6 Feb. 2022.
“Boeing-Airbus Trade Row Set to End after 17 Years.” BBC News, 15 June 2021, www.bbc.com/news/business-57484209. Accessed 6 Feb. 2022.
Boyanton, Megan. “How the Post-Brexit U.S.-U.K. Trade Deal Lost Momentum.” Www.bloomberg.com, 14 Oct. 2021, www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-10-14/how-post-brexit-u-s-u-k-trade-deal-lost-momentum-quicktake.