Prioritizing Petén: the End of Oil Extraction in Guatemala’s Campo Xan
Jorge Serrano, the former Guatemalan president now living in exile in Panama, questioned the current government’s decision to end Perenco’s petroleum extraction operations at the Campo Xan site in a charged video uploaded to his YouTube channel in August 2025 (Serrano 2025). Many of the country’s political and business elites agree with Serrano that the government mismanaged the situation, specifically supporting his claim that the proposed path forward will cause significant economic harm to the state by leaving too many natural resources untapped. However, given the inequality that plagues Guatemala and the historic dominance of elite interests in governmental decision-making, the intentions behind these critiques are unclear. For the current president, Arévalo, who is approaching the halfway point of his term, this issue may very well be the biggest test of his presidency. Specifically, his campaign focused on issues of corruption and the government’s participation in the economy, so taking a firm stance against the contract’s renewal is the only way to stay faithful to his supporters. Considering the immense scale of environmental degradation caused by decades of oil extraction operations within a protected area, President Arévalo’s administration must disregard politically motivated attacks and take a firm, decisive stance against renewing oil extraction to preserve the country’s biodiversity and stabilize the government.
Historical context surrounding the politics of the Campo Xan site highlights why the end of Perenco’s operations in Guatemala is a turning point for the country. Perenco, a French-British company, began operating in the Campo Xan site in 2001 (Vigna 2025). However, oil extraction began in Guatemala in 1985 when the state partnered with Hispanoil and Basic Petroleum International Limited. Hispanoil exited the partnership early, but Basic Petroleum continued operations until Perenco absorbed the firm and took over all activities in 2001 (Alonzo 2025; Escalón 2016). The next major event took place in 2007, when Sergio Veliz Rizzo, the then executive secretary of the national council on protected areas, modified the national plan of the Laguna del Tigre National Park, in which the extraction site sits, to benefit Perenco. He was sentenced to three years in prison for this crime in 2012 (Escalón 2016). In 2010, President Álvaro Colom’s administration extended the contract with Perenco until 2025. However, in 2015, after the end of Colom’s term, the Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources denounced Colom for signing this extension, and the Attorney General’s office even recommended that Perenco pause its operations until they conducted an assessment of their environmental impact (Alonzo 2025). These dynamics created an uncomfortable scenario for Perenco: the firm stood in an unfavorable position with the government but remained contractually protected until 2025. As a result, long-term investments aimed at improving infrastructure or ameliorating environmental impact became unlikely and illogical due to the low probability of an extension beyond 2025, leaving Perenco with its legal rights intact but limited strategic options. For the government, these circumstances were also far from ideal. But because Colom’s extension added 15 years to the contract—and Guatemalan presidents serve only a single 4-year term—many administrations avoided the issue. This period of under-regulation contributed to building resentment, setting the stage for the 2023 presidential election, when Arévalo was elected president for the term that included the contract’s termination and assigned the responsibility of deciding the “Campo Xan” site’s future.
The political history of oil extraction in Guatemala highlights the complex dynamics between private and public interests. It also emphasizes that the environment, arguably the biggest loser from Perenco’s time in Guatemala, was repeatedly excluded from negotiations before 2025. Oil extraction inherently poses immense risks for environmental damage, but the unique location of the “Campo Xan” site within Guatemala’s northern Petén department exacerbates the scale of consequences. As noted earlier, the “Campo Xan” site is located inside the Laguna del Tigre National Park, which lies within the greater Maya Biosphere Reserve. Housing over 100 species of mammals and reptiles, 500 bird species, and 2,500 species of vascular plants, the Maya Biosphere Reserve is of crucial importance to Guatemala’s biodiversity and environmental health (Vigna 2025; Unesco n.d.). It is important to note that the Maya Biosphere Reserve received international protected status in 1990, several years after oil extraction began in Guatemala in 1985. Nevertheless, many important political events, including Colom’s extension of the contract and Veliz Rizzio’s manipulation of the Laguna del Tigre’s national plan, occurred well after the region obtained its protected status (Escalón 2016). President Arévalo has emphasized the consequences of these actions, noting that Guatemala has lost more than 6,000 hectares of forest since operations began and that, in 2025, the site’s operations had become so inefficient that they required contaminating over 100,000 barrels of water to produce just 2,500 barrels of oil (Larios 2025). Ultimately, these figures show that the current administration must take a firm stance against renewing oil extraction in protected areas to safeguard Guatemala’s environment.
Despite the clear environmental costs of continuing oil extraction in this protected region, political actors with interests diverging from the current administration continue to pressure President Arévalo to renew operations by promoting misleading narratives. President Arévalo recognized the importance of the Campo Xan issue early in his term, announcing in April 2024, over a year before the contract’s expiration date, that he would not renew Perenco’s contract and all oil operations in protected areas would end during his presidency (Prensa Comunitaria KM 169 2024). Despite this, several political and economic elites leveraged their platforms to demand a different path forward. Former president Jorge Serrano raised two main arguments against ending all operations: that Guatemala cannot afford to give up petroleum extraction as a source of income, and that contracting the Mexican oil company Pemex, a firm with numerous past corruption scandals, as an advisor during the dissolution period signifies corruption within the current administration (Serrano 2025). There is merit behind Serrano’s first point on affordability, especially taking into account that President Arévalo’s government approved an increase of more than 20% for the government’s 2025 budget (Congreso de la República de Guatemala). However, because the government lost money on Perenco’s extraction operations—receiving $714 million in payments between 2010 and 2023 but reimbursing upwards of $900 million dollars in operating costs—the change in revenue would not be as drastic as Serrano implies, potentially even benefiting the country numerically (Vigna 2025). The more nuanced part of Serrano’s argument, which directly aligns with a point made by the unsuccessful 2023 presidential candidate Carlos Pineda in an August 2025 TikTok video, is that the state is denying Guatemalan citizens potential earnings by prematurely ending operations (Serrano 2025; Pineda 2025). Superficially, this appears to be a compelling argument, but both Pineda and Serrano purposely omit the key piece of evidence that the extraction site lies within a protected reserve. The most plausible explanation for this omission is that ignoring this fact and betting on their audiences to be ill-informed is the only way to avoid the government's explicit goal to end all oil extraction operations in protected areas. The deliberate choice by opponents of Arévalo’s government to ignore evidence indicates that their goals do not align with the public’s interests. Instead, their aim appears to be to destabilize the current administration. President Arévalo’s transparency does not inherently prove that his administration’s interests are morally superior to those of his opponents. However, given the scale of documented environmental degradation, stopping an unproductive source of income to prioritize the environment is the responsible choice for the country’s future.
Serrano’s choice to highlight the government’s ties to a corrupt organization like Pemex is also vital to understanding the ongoing discussion. Specifically, growing fears of government corruption amongst the public, fueled by the ongoing “Casa de Chocobananos” investigation of high-ranking government officials, show that Serrano’s accusations are not far-fetched (Gonzalez 2025). The aforementioned national budget increase furthers this point of growing fears of corruption because President Arévalo’s Semilla party allowed Congress to pass an increase in salaries for all of its members. It is crucial to note that the Semilla party did not propose nor vote in favor of this change. Nevertheless, the Party and its members will forever be associated with this increase because they held the presidency when it passed (Escobar 2024). Additionally, in November 2024, around the time the budget was approved, Judge Fredy Orellana stripped the Semilla party of its official standing as a registered political bloc. President Arévalo argued that this decision was unfounded, but this defense did not prevent Judge Orellana from proceeding (Delcid 2024). Understanding that President Arévalo’s adversaries have relentlessly bombarded his administration with accusations of corruption throughout his term shows that the Campo Xan site allegations are simply a continuation of the opposition’s strategy to build public distrust. Given the accusations’ failure to destabilize this administration’s first term, President Arévalo should remain firm in his decision to end oil extraction in Guatemala’s protected areas, simultaneously stabilizing the government and ensuring that the environment is a priority moving forward.
In countries with a strong rule of law, an area receiving internationally protected status as a nature reserve would be a sufficient legal basis to end all oil extraction of such a site immediately. Guatemala does not have a strong rule of law. Thus, operations at Campo Xan continued freely for almost four decades. President Arévalo’s decision to finally end oil extraction in Guatemala should be uncontroversial. However, by relying on public disinformation and capitalizing on corruption scandals, his political adversaries continue pressuring his government to continue extraction. President Arévalo must stand firm in the decision to protect the environment in the face of continued pressure from political opponents.
References
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